Local Govt System: The Experience of KP

Kamal Abdul Jamil

The local government system in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is in the final stage of its term. The tenure of representatives from the first phase has already ended, while the second phase will conclude in June. With this, an ineffective and powerless local system will come to an end.
Despite four local government systems, two during General Pervez Musharraf’s period and two under the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government, the key question remains: why has the system failed to become strong, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?
There are two main reasons for this weakness: political and administrative. Politically, the main issues are rivalry and resistance, along with a lack of seriousness among local representatives.
It is worth noting that local governments received support during the rule of General Ayub, General Zia, and General Pervez Musharraf. However, under democratic governments, political resistance against them tends to increase.
The Constitution of Pakistan addresses local governments under Article 140-A, which requires provinces to establish local bodies and transfer political, administrative, and financial powers to elected representatives. In practice, however, political support for strong local governments has remained weak.
Many national and provincial leaders see empowered local governments as a threat to their authority. In reality, local governments serve as training grounds for future political leadership. Many politicians who later became members of national and provincial assemblies began their careers at this level.
During General Musharraf’s era, the local government system introduced under the devolution plan was relatively strong. District governments had administrative, financial, and development powers, and the District Nazim acted as the chief executive. Although elections were non-party, political forces still participated. Over time, however, the system was weakened through policy decisions and official notifications, and it was eventually abolished at the end of its second term, after the 18th Amendment.
The second term of the LG system under LGO-2001 also faced challenges due to deteriorating security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly in the Malakand Division.
Political leaders at both national and provincial levels often complained that district officers did not respond to them and that they had no role in transfers and postings and other public-related matters at the district. These concerns were widely discussed in the media and in the provincial assembly.
During the ANP government, the post of District Coordination Officer (DCO) was abolished, and the old system of Deputy Commissioner (DC) and Assistant Commissioner was restored. Executive District Officer positions were also removed, bringing back strong bureaucratic control. For several years, the province operated without elected local governments, while District Development Advisory Committees were formed to give MPAs influence at the district level.
When PTI came to power, it promised an “ideal” local government system. However, under the 2015 model, district governments were replaced with weak district councils. The District Nazim became only the head of a council, while real authority remained with the Deputy Commissioner. The Rural Development Department was strengthened, and village councils were placed under direct administrative control. Financial resources were also limited.
Council decisions were not binding, and conflicts between Nazims and Deputy Commissioners became common. Similar was the situation with Tehsil councils and village councils. Even approved development projects faced delays, reinforcing the perception that real power rested with the administration rather than elected representatives.
Although PTI leaders described it as the best system, its weaknesses became clear over time. Despite this, it continued to be presented as a model for other provinces by Imran Khan and CM Pervez Khattak with the advice to adopt it in other provinces.
After the system completed its term, discussions on reforms began. Workshops and meetings were held where bureaucrats and experts shared their views. However, they showed reluctance in fully transferring authority, fearing it would weaken administrative control. Political leadership also supported maintaining provincial control.
As a result, instead of focusing on service delivery and real devolution of power, a system was created that was technically complex but politically, administratively, and financially weak. It lacked authority, resources, and independence.
The most damaging decision was the removal of the district tier, even though an effective system requires three levels: district, tehsil, and union council. Without the district level, power became centralized at the provincial level, and local governments were again deprived of resources.
This weak system was approved by the provincial assembly. Analysts believe it was intentionally kept weak to maintain control over transfers, development funds, and administrative authority.
The bureaucracy also benefits from such arrangements, as they help maintain strong connections with those in power.
Another issue is that local government systems are often designed by bureaucrats or experts influenced by them, making it difficult to create a truly empowered structure.
It must also be acknowledged that many local representatives did not fulfill their responsibilities effectively. Although councils had the authority to make rules, more than 80% failed to do so across different terms. This reflects a lack of responsibility and commitment, which has weakened public trust.
In many cases, Nazims tried to concentrate power instead of sharing it with councils. Some leaders controlled councils in their own way, often ignoring rules. Where funds were available, influential members benefited more, while representatives of women, peasants, minorities, and youth received less attention.
These weaknesses gave critics grounds to argue that empowering local governments could create more problems.
However, it is not fair to blame the entire system for these shortcomings. Even parliament and provincial assemblies do not always perform effectively, yet no one suggests abolishing them. Instead, efforts are made to improve them. If the parliamentary system since 1973 has not fully delivered, it is unreasonable to repeatedly declare a short-term local system a failure.
As the fourth term ends, it is clear that this has been the weakest system so far, producing representatives without real authority, funds, or responsibility. If the government continues with this structure, holding new elections will only waste public resources.
A new approach is needed in line with the Constitution. A clear and practical relationship must be established between MNAs, MPAs, and local governments. The district tier should be restored to ensure real devolution of power, accountability, and effective service delivery.
A strong, representative, empowered, and accountable three-tier local government system is essential for better governance.
Focusing only on symptoms will not solve the problem—we must address the root causes.

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